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Political Incorporation in Measures of Democracy: A Missing 
Dimension (and the Case of Bolivia) 
Since President Morales took office in Bolivia in early 2006, the country has 
undergone a complex political transformation. This profound process of change 
is, however, hardly reflected in established democracy indices, which by and 
large paint a picture of institutional continuity. Taking this puzzling observation 
as a starting point, the paper compares qualitative and quantitative assessments of 
Bolivia’s contemporary political regime and argues that existing measures of 
democracy largely miss one key dimension that is crucial when it comes to 
analyzing (changes in) the quality of democracy: the issue of political 
incorporation. Specifically, the case of Bolivia shows that democracy indices 
mostly ignore important changes in terms of descriptive representation, party 
incorporation, and non-electoral participation. Privileging an individualist 
conception of liberal democracy, democracy measures downplay the relevance of 
collective forms of political representation and participation and, hence, the 
extent to which different social groups are or are not incorporated into the 
political system. As a result, these measures of democracy mostly do not “count” 
the recent progress in the political incorporation of important parts of the 
Bolivian population, which had been largely absent from the country’s political 
institutions despite of two decades of continuous democratic rule.  
Keywords: quality of democracy; transformation of democracy; democracy 
indices; democracy measures; democratization; political incorporation; Bolivia; 
Latin America 
Introduction 
When looking at the recent evolution of Bolivia’s democracy through the lenses of 
established indices of democracy, a curious picture arises: Since the country’s first 
indigenous president, Evo Morales, first took office in January 2006, Bolivia has 
basically seen continuity in its political regime, with some gradual shifts only and 
certainly without any kind of radical institutional change. This assessment is puzzling 
because it contrasts significantly with qualitative analyses, which generally agree that 
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Bolivia during the Morales government has underwent a process of profound political 
transformation – even if observers heavily disagree on how to evaluate these changes in 
conceptual and normative terms. 
In this paper, I use the case of Bolivia to show that established measures of 
democracy, different as they are, share a common blind spot: they largely ignore a key 
dimension of political participation and representation that, in comparative-historical 
research, has been conceptualized as political incorporation.1 This holds true not only 
for indices that rely on a procedural or institutionalist definition of liberal democracy 
but, by and large, also for those that have been deliberately designed to include also the 
substance and/or variety of democratic institutions and practices. Privileging an 
individualist conception of liberal democracy, I argue, all indices downplay the 
relevance of collective forms of political representation and participation and, hence, 
only in exceptional cases look at the extent to which different social sectors or classes 
are or are not incorporated into the political system. 
As a result, these measures of democracy mostly do not “count” the fact that 
important parts of the Bolivian population, which had been largely absent from the 
country’s political institutions despite of two decades of continuous democratic rule, in 
recent years have experienced a dramatic process of political incorporation. This 
process of incorporation has been quite contradictory and limited in many ways. Still, 
there is little doubt that the ways in which previously marginalized social groups have 
been incorporated into Bolivian politics are of crucial relevance for the kind of political 
regime that has taken shape in the country and, thus, for the quality of Bolivian 
democracy. In highlighting the relevance of political incorporation for democratic 
quality, the case of Bolivia offers important insights for contemporary debates in the 
comparative study of democracy. It specifically suggests that attempts to broaden the 
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conception and measurement of (the quality of) democracy beyond a narrow focus on 
liberal, representative democracy should take collective, and class- or status-based 
patterns of representation and participation more seriously. 
The article starts by reviewing studies that take stock of the nature of the 
political regime as it has emerged under president Morales. These qualitative 
assessments are, then, contrasted with quantitative measures as reported by the most 
important democracy indices. In a third step, the divergence between the two types of 
assessments is discussed, focusing on the blind spots in quantitative measures of 
democracy when it comes to the question of political incorporation. In the conclusion, I 
summarize the findings and situate them in the context of broader debates about the 
quality and the variety of democracy. Before beginning the analysis, however, a brief 
overview of the political changes during the Morales government is in order. 
The MAS government: A brief overview 
In December 2005, the union leader, coca grower and head of the leftist political 
movement Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) Evo Morales was elected president of 
Bolivia by an absolute majority of the vote, becoming the country’s first head of state of 
indigenous origin.2 This electoral victory came after a wave of mass protests during 
which the MAS, and Morales personally, established themselves as the leading 
representatives of a diverse alliance of indigenous, peasant and urban popular 
movements. In line with key demands that had been put forward by these movements, 
the MAS government initiated a process of profound political change that included the 
restructuring of the political system via a constituent assembly. 
Following a conflict-ridden process of constitution writing, a new constitution 
was finally approved in a referendum in January 2009 with more than 60 percent of 
support. In terms of the general features of the political regime, this new constitution 
5 
preserves the basic norms and institutions of liberal democracy, but complements 
representative institutions with direct-democratic and participatory mechanisms and 
adds far-reaching economic, social and collective indigenous rights to the usual 
catalogue of political and civil rights. In terms of direct and participatory forms of 
democracy, the constitution provides for referenda, citizens’ legislative initiatives and 
the revocation of mandates, and grants “organized civil society” the rights to participate 
in the design of public policies as well as to exercise social control over state 
administration, public enterprises and institutions.3 At the same time, the constitution 
“reinforces executive power”4 and maintains a “strongly presidentialist” system.5 
At the end of 2009, Morales was re-elected and the MAS won a two-thirds 
majority in the new parliament. Two years later, the judiciary was elected by popular 
vote, as envisaged by the 2009 constitution. Given its two-thirds majority in parliament, 
the MAS dominated the preselection of the candidates. As a consequence, the national 
courts, including the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, have generally been 
seen as overly close to the government. In a controversial decision by the Constitutional 
Court, Morales was authorized to run for a third term in the 2014 elections, which he 
again won by a wide margin. In February 2016, however, when the Bolivian people 
voted on a constitutional reform that would have allowed Morales to run for yet another 
term in 2019, a narrow majority rejected the governmental proposal. While the 
government accepted the defeat, the MAS decided to use an alternative strategy and, in 
September 2017, issued an appeal to the constitutional court to declare the term limit 
unconstitutional. At the time of writing, the decision was pending with the 
constitutional court (La Razón, September 29, 2017). 
Qualitative assessments of Bolivian democracy under Evo Morales 
Ever since Morales was first elected in 2005, the MAS government has been under 
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continued scrutiny by academic observers both within and outside Bolivia. Now, with 
Morales more than a decade in power and with the political institutions as designed by 
the 2009 constitution arguably in full operation, a series of studies have started to take 
stock of the political regime that has taken shape during the years of MAS rule. One 
important strand of contributions focuses on the question of the political regime type 
and discusses whether contemporary Bolivia should still be seen as a democracy or not 
and, more specifically, which subtype of democratic or authoritarian regimes might best 
characterize the country’s political system. In general, there is widespread recognition 
that the political regime has changed significantly under the Morales government – but 
observers disagree strongly about the kind of regime that has emerged. 
A series of scholars observe a process of de-democratization that has culminated 
in the establishment of an authoritarian regime. A prominent example are Steven 
Levitsky and James Loxton who observe the emergence of a competitive authoritarian 
regime.6 The key reasons given for this categorization include the elimination of 
“institutional checks on executive power”, the series of “criminal charges against 
numerous opposition leaders”, the mobilization of “social movement allies to intimidate 
opponents” as well as the series of “threats, physical attacks, and lawsuits against 
journalists and other critics”.7 The overall result is an “electoral regime in which 
widespread incumbent abuse skewed the playing field against opponents”.8 
While stopping short of classifying the country as an authoritarian regime, Scott 
Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s assessment of what they call “semidemocracy” 
in Bolivia is very similar. Drawing on Sebastián Mazzuca’s notion of “plebiscitarian 
hegemonies”, they describe both the “semidemocratic” regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador 
and the “competitive authoritarian” ones in Nicaragua and Venezuela as “political 
regimes legitimized by popular vote but with a highly skewed electoral playing field, 
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crippled mechanisms of horizontal accountability and intolerance toward the 
opposition”.9 
A more extreme position is taken by René A. Mayorga who explicitly rejects 
labelling contemporary Bolivia as a case of “delegative democracy”, “semi-democracy” 
or “competitive authoritarianism”.10 Because the government has progressively 
eliminated the limited pluralism that existed, liquidated the division of power, and 
broken with the rule of law, Bolivia – alongside Ecuador and Venezuela – is seen as a 
“full-blown authoritarian regime sui generis” (“un tipo de regimen autoritario pleno sui 
generis”).11 The key issue that defines the border between competitive and full-blown 
(noncompetitive) authoritarian regimes is whether “constitutional channels exist 
through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power”.12 
In contrast to Levitsky and Loxton and others, Mayorga argues that the skewing of the 
electoral playing field by the MAS government together with the weakness and 
fragmentation of the opposition has meant that there is no longer any meaningful 
challenge to the government at the national level (although there still may be some at 
the regional and local level).13 
Yet, at the same time, Mayorga calls the authoritarian regimes in Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela “sui generis” because they hold elections and referendums – if 
“of a plebiscitary and manipulated nature” – in which marginalized rivals do compete. 
Pointing, inter alia, to the lost constitutional referendum in February 2016, he then 
suggests that “this very mechanism of plebiscitary electoral legitimation” has become 
“the Achilles heel” of the authoritarian regimes at hand – implying that electoral 
competition has still to be meaningful to some extent.14 In the end, therefore, his 
analysis largely corresponds to the notion of a “competitive authoritarian regime”. 
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Such a categorization has been explicitly rejected by scholars that still describe 
Bolivia as a democratic regime. Santiago Anria, for instance, has argued that “Bolivia 
remains a democracy, albeit one with liberal deficits and ‘delegative’ features”. The key 
observation behind this assessment is that “the integrity of core electoral institutions 
remains intact despite civil-liberties violations”.15 
In the same vein, Maxwell Cameron has suggested that Bolivia represents a case 
of “delegative democracy” as defined by Guillermo O’Donnell, given that all conditions 
for an electoral democracy are present while a key element of liberal democracy (rule of 
law/horizontal accountability) is missing.16 Against the notion of an overly skewed 
electoral playing field, Cameron argues that the series of electoral successes of the MAS 
is due to “convincing and stable majorities” that have sustained the MAS government,17 
and, indeed, few observers dispute the observation that Morales, until recently, has 
received majoritarian support among the population.18 This argument has also been 
confirmed by the 2016 referendum, which the government lost. This referendum, first, 
demonstrated that the opposition, as soon as it was able to capitalize on the weakening 
of popular support for the government and to unite behind a common demand, could 
successfully challenge the MAS through electoral means. Second, the electoral process 
has been shown to be reasonably free, transparent and fair.19 Third, as far as the 
electoral outcome is concerned, it is crucial to note that “Morales accepted his 2016 
referendum loss”.20  
Franz Barrios, who offers a particularly sophisticated discussion of the different 
conceptual proposals, their theoretical premises, and the extent to which they (fail to) 
grasp important elements of the Bolivian regime, mostly agrees with this assessment. 
Barrios, like Anria and Cameron, argues that there are serious problems with horizontal 
accountability in contemporary Bolivia, but that electoral competition is not sufficiently 
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constrained so as to justify the label of a competitive authoritarian regime as defined by 
Levitsky and Way: Competition is “not only real, but still fair”.21 It is only for the 
contingent fact that the Constitutional Court in 2013 re-interpreted the constitution in an 
arguably unconstitutional way, thereby allowing Morales to run again in 2014, that 
Barrios sees the conditions for democratic elections overly undermined and, as a 
consequence, classifies Bolivia since then as a non-democratic regime.22 
This conceptual debate on how best to categorize Bolivia’s political regime is 
certainly an important one – not least because it also has political implications.23 Still, 
what is most interesting for the topic at hand, is that these observers – different as their 
overall assessment of, and their normative take on, the Morales government clearly are 
– agree on three things: that there (a) has been a significant transformation of Bolivia’s 
political regime since Morales first took power in early 2006; that (b) this process has 
weakened or undermined key features of liberal democracy (in particular, in terms of 
institutional checks and balances and horizontal accountability); and (c) that there is 
something unusually participatory with the kind of political regime that has emerged 
under MAS rule. 
With a view to the third observation, Levitsky and Loxton acknowledge that 
Morales – whom they, therefore, call a “movement populist” – “differed from full 
populists in that his linkage to supporters was more participatory than personalistic”, 
and that the MAS has “maintained mechanisms of consultation and accountability to the 
rank-and-file that had no parallel in other populist cases”.24 Anria, Barrios, and 
Cameron likewise argue that one problem with applying O’Donnell’s concept of 
“delegative democracy” to contemporary Bolivia is the fact that it is much more 
participatory and/or responsive than the regimes O’Donnell had in mind. “So if Bolivia 
is a delegative democracy,” Anria argues, “it is one with ‘incorporating’ features that 
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make it more responsive to popular input than a ‘classic’ delegative regime would be”.25 
While Bolivia’s weak horizontal accountability is very much in line with O’Donnell’s 
concept, vertical accountability is not limited to episodic elections but is exercised 
continuously, in particular by relative autonomous social organizations that put pressure 
on the government, but also through new participatory institutions and mechanisms of 
direct democracy.26 
These participatory and inclusionary features are also highlighted by scholars 
who are not so much concerned with the overall (democratic) quality of Bolivia’s 
emerging political regime, but rather focus on the ways in which democratic institutions 
and practices in Bolivia have been transformed during the MAS government. María 
Teresa Zegada and Jorge Komadina, for instance, have shown that Bolivian parliaments 
at both the national and the subnational level have seen important improvements since 
2005 in terms of descriptive representation: Parliaments now reflect much better the 
actual composition of Bolivian society in terms of social and ethnic groups than before, 
benefiting in particular traditionally marginalized groups such as indigenous people, 
peasants, and women.27 Analyzing the construction of “intercultural democracy” in 
Bolivia, Fernando Mayorga and Moira Zuazo conclude that the broadening of 
representative democracy through mechanisms of direct and participatory as well as of 
communitarian democracy is an ongoing and open-ended process that confronts serious 
problems and limitations, in particular when it comes to their formal institutionalization, 
but that is still real and substantial.28 And Alicia Lissidini, in her discussion of direct 
democracy in Latin America, has emphasized that “Bolivia maintains a high degree of 
citizen participation”, both in terms of protest activity and through formal channels such 
as elections and political parties.29 With a view to the latter, the governing MAS party 
has been identified as a key vehicle through which traditionally marginalized social 
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sectors in Bolivia, and indigenous and peasant groups in particular, have been able to 
increase their access to the political system – even if in selective, inegalitarian and 
partially informal ways (see below).30 
As Santiago Anria and Eduardo Silva have explicitly suggested, the concept of 
political incorporation, as developed in the seminal work of Collier and Collier,31 is 
useful to grasp these changes in the patterns of representation and participation in 
contemporary Bolivia. Conceptually, the political incorporation of a given social sector 
can be defined as a multidimensional process that involves “the creation or 
reformulation of formal and informal rules and regulations that govern their 
participation in politics, and their connection to the policy process”.32 In the specific 
case at hand, the overall empirical observation is that Bolivia during the MAS years has 
witnessed a significant process of political incorporation of the so-called popular 
sectors, that is, of traditionally marginalized social sectors in both urban and rural 
areas.33  
Quantitative measures of Bolivian democracy under Evo Morales 
As I will demonstrate in this section, important changes to Bolivian democracy as 
emphasized by the qualitative studies reviewed above are not at all grasped by 
quantitative measurements of democracy. The former, as seen, largely agree that 
Bolivia’s political regime has seen a profound but contradictory process of change that 
combines a weakening of the liberal component of democracy with significant 
improvements in terms of a political incorporation of traditionally marginalized social 
sectors. Established indices of democracy, in contrast, suggest a basic continuity of the 
political regime inherited by the Morales government, with only limited and gradual 
changes that mainly point in an illiberal direction. Most quantitative measures, thus, 
capture the deterioration in certain dimensions of liberal democracy, but they largely 
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miss the substantive changes in terms of participation and representation. Interestingly, 
with a few exceptions, this blind spot also characterizes indices – such as the Varieties 
of Democracy project – that explicitly include non-liberal conceptions of democracy. 
According to Freedom House, Bolivia continues to be an “electoral democracy” 
which is “partially free” only. The two indicators that measure political rights and civil 
liberties, respectively, have seen no change during the years of the Morales government: 
On scales from 1-7 (with 1 being the best rating), Bolivia continuously rates 3 on both 
scores. 34 When looking at specific sub-categories, there are some gradual shifts: 
decreases in “political pluralism and participation”, “associational and organizational 
rights” as well as “rule of law”, but improvements in “functioning of government”.35 
The Polity IV index, which focuses on key institutional features of 
representative democracy, identifies a gradual, but limited de-democratization: In 2009, 
with the adoption of the new constitution and the reelection of president Morales, the 
Bolivian regime was downgraded from +8 to +7 on the Policy IV scale, which ranges 
from -10 to +10 and considers regimes of +6 or more as “democracies”. This change 
reflects a lower rating in the category of “executive constraints” (which presumably 
reflects the combination of weak judicial controls of the executive with the two-thirds 
majority of the governing MAS in the newly elected legislative assembly). Since then, 
however, Polity has seen no further changes and Bolivia, thus, remains safely in the 
category of democratic regimes.36 
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), in contrast, reports gradual 
improvements in the status of Bolivian democracy, after an initial worsening in the 
context of the contested process of constitutional reform.37 In terms of the specific 
dimensions measured by the BTI, the most significant improvement is reported in the 
area of “political and social integration” (in particular, in the sub-category “approval of 
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democracy”).38 Overall, however, Bolivia basically remains in the same regime 
category, a “defective democracy” in the terminology used by the BTI.39 
The Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem), which provides several indices 
based on different conceptions of democracy, generally confirms this picture of gradual, 
but complex developments. The overall trend, here, is again one of a slight decrease in 
the quality of democracy. More specifically, the indices measuring “electoral 
democracy” as well as the additional components bringing in “liberal” and “delegative” 
conceptions of democracy report gradual decreases, whereas the “egalitarian” and the 
“participatory” component indices show improvements.40 The decreases are particular 
due to lower scores for “clean elections” (because of concerns relating to the autonomy 
and the capacity of the election management body), “freedom of expression”, and 
“freedom of association” (electoral component); for “legislative constraints on the 
executive” (liberal component); as well as for “respect counterarguments” (deliberative 
component). The increase in the egalitarian component reflects the assessment that the 
“equality in respect for civil liberties” has improved for different “social groups” and 
disadvantaged “social classes”. Within the participatory component, the “direct popular 
vote index” and the “regional government index” improve significantly after 2005, even 
if both decrease again in recent years. The sub-index that most directly touches on the 
question of non-electoral political participation (“civil society participation index”) also 
increases gradually, and likewise decreases again in recent years. More specifically, it is 
the extent to which civil society organizations are consulted by policymakers that is 
seen to have significantly increased between 2005 and 2009.  
Finally, the Índice de Desarrollo Democrático de América Latina (IDD-Lat) 
also measures different dimensions of democracy, focusing on Latin America only. In 
the overall IDD-Lat ranking, Bolivia has improved significantly in recent years, after an 
14 
initial deterioration between 2005 and 2009. Since 2014, Bolivia has been categorized 
as a country with a “medium” level of democratic development (instead of previous 
“low” or even “minimal” levels) and is now clearly above the Latin American 
average.41 When looking at the sub-indices that measure the political regime properly 
speaking,42 IDD-Lat reports almost continuous improvements in the dimension called 
“citizens’ democracy” (democracia de los ciudadanos), which assesses respect for right 
and liberties. The key driver, here, has been dramatic increases in the representation of 
women in the government (including parliament and the judiciary). In the dimension 
called “institutional democracy” (democracia de las instituciones), in contrast, scores 
had initially fallen during the first years of the Morales government, but have recently 
risen again to slightly surpass the 2005 level. This latter re-increase is basically due to 
improvements in terms of political stabilization/normalization; continuous deficits are 
particularly observed in the areas of “perception of corruption” and “accountability”.43  
When comparing these democracy indices with the diverse qualitative 
assessments summarized above, what is striking is, first, the fact that they converge in 
reporting a basic continuity of Bolivia’s democratic regime. While most quantitative 
measures do identify an illiberal trend (gradual decreases in certain civil liberties, 
horizontal accountability and the rule of law), none of the measures supports those 
liberal scholars that see Bolivia under Morales moving into the camp of authoritarian 
regimes. The second difference is that the peculiarly participatory or inclusive nature of 
Bolivia’s contemporary political regime, which is emphasized by qualitative studies, is 
almost entirely missing from the picture painted by the democracy indices. In the 
following section, I will discuss in detail this latter divergence between quantitative and 
qualitative assessments of Bolivian democracy. 
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Divergence and blind spots in assessments of democratic quality 
The advances in terms of popular sector incorporation that are identified in qualitative 
studies on contemporary Bolivia concern three main dimensions: (1) descriptive 
representation; (2) party incorporation; and (3) non-electoral participation. In this 
section, I discuss the qualitative findings on what has changed in Bolivia in these three 
dimensions of political incorporation and confront them with the (limited) extent to 
which they are taken into account by quantitative measures. In doing so, I also show 
general blind spots that characterize the ways in which established democracy indices 
assess (changes in) the quality of democracy regimes. As will be seen, all indices, if to 
varying degrees, privilege an individualist conception of liberal democracy, downplay 
the relevance of collective forms of political representation and participation and, hence, 
only in exceptional cases look at the extent to which different social sectors or classes 
are or are not incorporated into the political system. 
The most obvious and least controversial change that observers of Bolivian 
democracy have noted concerns the dimension of descriptive representation, that is, the 
extent to which the composition of state institutions corresponds to or resembles the 
composition of the political community at hand.44 With a view to the composition of 
Bolivian parliaments at the national and subnational level, empirical research reveals a 
dramatic increase in the presence of previously underrepresented groups such as 
peasants, indigenous peoples and women as well as formal and informal sector 
workers.45 Corresponding shifts can be also observed in the executive level,46 the 
judiciary47 and the state bureaucracy.48 
The empirical correspondence between the representatives and those that are to 
be represented is certainly only one dimension of democratic representation,49 and 
descriptive representation does, in and of itself, obviously not guarantee more 
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representative policymaking in terms substantive representation or responsiveness.50 
Still, it is hard to dispute that it says something about the quality of Bolivian democracy 
whether in this predominantly indigenous and poor country indigenous and 
socioeconomically less well-off people are actually present in the official political arena 
in a more than marginal position. And yet, this question is all but ignored by the 
democracy indices analysed above. 
The index that comes closest to incorporating the issue at hand is V-Dem. Most 
importantly, two V-Dem indicators assess the relative “political power” in terms of both 
“socioeconomic position” (whether wealthy people have more power) and “social 
groups” (how equally distributed political power is according to social groups).51 Both 
indicators show improvements for Bolivia since 2005, but the increases remain very 
limited only and, thus, do not appropriately reflect the significant changes reported 
above. This is different for one variable that directly measures what is at stake here: 
“Representation of disadvantaged social groups [in the national legislature]”. The values 
assigned to Bolivia adequately suggest that the situation of disadvantaged social groups 
in the country, which had remained worse than “highly under-represented” until 2005, 
changed to a little better than “slightly under-represented” (2016). The extent of this 
improvement in the rating is comparable only to the introduction of universal suffrage 
after the 1952 revolution and, thus, signals a dramatic change in Bolivian democracy. 
Yet, and this is remarkable given the breadth and complexity of V-Dem’s democracy 
measurement, this indicator is not included in any of the democracy indices.  
As mentioned above, IDD-Lat’s “citizens’ democracy” is the only index that 
reports a significant improvement in the quality of Bolivia’s democracy. Interesting, as 
noted, this is mainly due to the fact that this index includes an indicator for the 
representation of women in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
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government. Relevant as this gender dimension certainly is, it makes it all the more 
striking that the political representation of other traditionally underrepresented social 
groups is not at all taken into account. 
The focus on descriptive representation in state institutions grasps, however, 
only one dimension of the political incorporation of the popular sectors during the 
Morales government. As mentioned above, the governing MAS has been a key channel 
of popular sector incorporation, which points to the second dimension: party 
incorporation.52 With the rise of the MAS to political power, social organizations and 
movements that represent important segments of the socioeconomically disadvantaged 
majority of the Bolivian population have gained access to the political arena and saw 
their actual influence on policymaking increase significantly. It is important to note that 
this political incorporation of popular sector claims and actors was far from egalitarian 
or universal. First, the national peasant organizations, which founded the party as their 
“political instrument”, have had privileged political access through and inside the MAS. 
The country’s explicitly indigenous organizations, non-peasant union federations and 
urban popular groups also benefited from the rise of the MAS, but in subordinate 
positions and only as long as they remained allied with the government. Second, these 
inegalitarian features, which have characterized popular sector incorporation through 
the MAS, are further reinforced by the prevalence of informal mechanisms, including 
clientelism, cooptation and personalist relationships. Third, the actual political influence 
of popular sector organizations has been constrained by the important role of a 
technocratic elite that has occupied key positions in the MAS government and, in 
particular, has dominated important policy areas such as economic policymaking.53  
The precise effect of the pattern of popular sector incorporation enabled by the 
MAS in contemporary Bolivia on the quality of the country’s democracy is, therefore, 
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ambivalent and contested. But, systematically speaking, it should be a relevant question 
whether the party system in a given country creates linkages between the population and 
the political system that enable a reasonably even political incorporation of social 
groups. Whether a party exists that systematically incorporates socioeconomically 
disadvantaged groups is certainly important in this regard. Again, it is striking that 
democracy indices hardly assess this arguably crucial question. 
In this case, it is the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s democracy index that pays certain 
attention to this issue in its democracy measurement. The BTI includes a question on 
the extent to which countries have “a stable and socially rooted party system able to 
aggregate societal interests”. Yet, whether a given party system enables the participation 
and representation of all relevant social groups or classes, including disadvantaged ones, 
is not to be considered.54 As a result, the indicator has seen only marginal changes in 
recent years. In the case of V-Dem, several variables focus on political parties, but none 
actually on questions of incorporation or interest intermediation – and none is included 
in V-Dem’s democracy indices anyway.55  
The third feature that is generally highlighted when it comes to emphasizing the 
peculiar participatory or inclusive nature of contemporary Bolivian democracy refers to 
non-electoral forms of political participation, that is, to formal and informal 
mechanisms that, in addition to individualist types of participation through elections and 
referendums, enable direct and collective forms of civil society participation. At the 
formal level, the 2009 constitution and a corresponding law require all state entities, 
public enterprises and institutions to establish procedures through which civil society 
organizations can participate in planning processes and exercise social control. As a 
consequence, new avenues for participation have been introduced that explicitly aim at 
directly involving “organized civil society”, even if the constitutional rights to 
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“participation and social control” are implemented in heterogeneous, but generally 
relatively restricted ways.56 More important are, therefore, the government’s largely 
informal practices of negotiation and dialogue with civil society organizations. These 
practices offer direct access to the political arena to popular sector organizations which 
are either allied with or able to put pressure on the government.57  
As these non-electoral forms of participation operate in inegalitarian and largely 
informal ways, their consequences for the quality of Bolivian democracy are, again, far 
from clear-cut. In addition, in this dimension, the actual amount of change since 2006 is 
much harder to tell because the extent of civil society participation – formal at the local 
level, informal and protest-driven at the national level – has already been relatively high 
in Bolivia before Morales became president.58 Still, the question whether there are 
broadened channels for and/or increasing levels of non-electoral participation by civil 
society groups is arguably a relevant one when it comes to assessing changes in the 
quality of a given democracy.  
In this case, there is at least one democracy index that includes corresponding 
measurements. As mentioned above, V-Dem has a specific “Civil society participation 
index”. This index encompasses, inter alia, an indicator that assesses the extent to which 
“major civil society organizations (CSOs) [are] routinely consulted by policymakers”.59 
The Bolivia rating for “CSO consultation” indeed increases significantly after 2005, but 
from 2010 onwards gradually decreases again – a trend that is in line with the 
qualitative assessments reported above. As concerns the issue of political incorporation, 
however, it is remarkable that the index ignores the question which social groups 
actually participate in and through these “major” CSOs (the exception being, again, the 
participation of women). At first sight, the BTI’s indicator “Interest groups” seems 
better able to grasp this issue in that it “addresses the representation of societal interests 
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in the political system”. The problem, here, is the normative bias of the BTI which 
emphasizes harmony, cooperation and non-polarization. Therefore, a broadening of the 
“spectrum of interest groups” and their “capacity to incorporate all (competing) social 
interests” is only assessed positively if this occurs in cooperative terms and without 
increasing the risk of polarization.60 As a result, the indicator does not vary at all during 
the first years of the Morales government (reflecting the fact that increasing levels of 
non-electoral participation were accompanied by rising polarization) and later increases 
slightly (when non-electoral participation arguably went down but polarization 
decreased even more). 
Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this article shows that established democracy indices largely 
ignore an issue that, in comparative-historical research, has been conceptualized as 
political incorporation: the extent to which different social groups or classes are actually 
enabled to participate in politics and connect with the policy process.61 Drawing on the 
case of Bolivia, I have argued that this question of political incorporation is key when 
assessing changes in the quality of democratic regimes. This finding is not very 
surprising for ratings such as Freedom House and Polity, which are deliberately based 
on a liberal conception of representative democracy – in these cases, it is rather striking 
that they identify much less of a deterioration of liberal democracy than liberal scholars 
who see Bolivia turning to an authoritarian regime. Of interest for this article is, 
however, that also indices such as BTI, IDD-Lat and V-Dem, which put forward 
broader perspectives on democracy, have difficulties in grasping collective forms of 
participation and representation, in particular when it comes to socioeconomically 
disadvantaged social groups.  
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A review of qualitative studies on the transformation of democracy in 
contemporary Bolivia revealed three specific blind spots in these quantitative 
assessments. In terms of (1) descriptive representation, Bolivia since 2005 has 
experienced dramatic improvements in the political representation of traditionally 
disadvantaged social groups. However, even the two indices that pay some attention to 
this issue miss the extent of the changes: IDD-Lat looks at the political representation of 
women only, while V-Dem deliberately excludes the key variable “Representation of 
disadvantaged social groups” from its democracy measurement. In terms of (2) party 
incorporation, Bolivia’s governing MAS party has significantly broadened access to the 
political arena for important segments of the popular sectors. Here, BTI is the only 
index that somehow considers the issue – but without being sensitive to the key 
question of who is actually incorporated by the party system. In the dimension of (3) 
non-electoral participation, Bolivia has seen important, if complex, changes in the 
patterns of interaction between the state and civil society organizations. Here, V-Dem’s 
“civil society participation index” comes closest to including an appropriate measure – 
but, again, fails to consider which social groups actually participate in and through 
existing civil society organizations. 
These findings generally confirm the well-known critique levelled against liberal 
theories of democracy in the tradition of Schumpeter and Dahl by proponents of some 
kind of participatory democracy: that the former limit participation to individual 
participation in elections and thereby deliberately constrain meaningful popular 
participation in politics.62 Given the disenchantment with democracy as well as the 
experimentation with democratic innovations that scholars have observed in Europe 
and, most notably, in Latin America, this critique has recently seen an important revival. 
The present contribution adds to the series of contributions that have emphasized – not 
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least on the pages of this journal – that we should also consider direct, deliberative and 
participatory mechanisms of democracy when trying to account for the (changing) 
quality of democratic regimes.63 But, by bringing in the question of the political 
incorporation of popular sectors, it highlights the relevance of collective, and social 
class- or status-related patterns of democratic participation and representation that are 
frequently marginalized even in these debates.64 
That the concept of political incorporation has been developed and used by 
scholars working on Latin America plausibly reflects the fact that such collective logics 
of participation have been particularly important in this region’s highly unequal 
societies, where democratic regimes have coexisted with persistent, if not increasing, 
political marginalization of large parts of the population. Also the debate on 
participatory democracy in Latin America has more seriously engaged with collective 
forms and patterns of participation.65 The issue, however, is of general relevance for 
comparative research on the quality of democracy, including its measurement. In a 
recent analysis of European democracies, for instance, Wolfgang Merkel and colleagues 
have identified “an increasing dropout of the lower classes from political participation 
and a trend to neglect the representation of their interests in parliament”, two related 
processes that signal a deterioration of democratic quality but are not reflected in 
mainstream indices.66 In the same vein, the introduction to a special issue on 
“Measuring the Quality of Democracy” mentions recent calls to improve quality-of-
democracy indices by including “descriptive representation of gender and minority 
groups, that is, the social stratification of legislatures” as well as “a wider range of 
procedures and structures that constrain or inform elite decision-making between 
elections, for example via active interest- and civil society groups”.67 As this article 
suggests, the concept of political incorporation offers a promising way to systematically 
23 
integrate these issues into the conceptualization and measurement of the varying 
qualities of democratic regimes. 
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